Evidence for different hypotheses is often treated as a singular construct, but it can be dissociated into two parts: its strength, the proportion of pieces of information favoring one hypothesis; and its weight, the total number of pieces of information available. However, cognitive and neural models of evidence accumulation often make a proportional representation assumption, implying that people take these two factors into account equally when making their decisions and judgments. We examine this assumption by directly manipulating the number of samples and the proportion favoring either of two alternatives in dynamic decision making and judgment tasks. The results suggest that people tend to over-emphasize the strength of evidence relative to its weight in both an optional-stopping decision task and a probability judgment task. In a drift-diffusion model, this is reflected by drift rates that are determined foremost by strength with a smaller influence of weight. This result challenges the proportional representation assumption made by existing models of judgment and decision-making, and calls into question modeling evidence accumulation as a Bayesian belief updating process.
Introduction
Ordinarily, information or evidence is thought of as a singular construct, one which informs our beliefs about and guides our actions in choosing between hypotheses or alternatives. However, evidence can often be dissociated into two components. These are the extremeness or proportion of instances where it favors a particular hypothesis -the strength of the evidence -and the total amount or reliability of the data -the weight of the evidence. Consider a simple example that Griffin and Tversky (1992) used to illustrate the distinction:
Imagine that you are spinning a coin, and recording how often it lands heads and tails. Unlike tossing, which (on average) yields an equal number of heads and tails, spinning a coin leads to a bias favoring one side or the other because of slight imperfections on the rim of the coin (an uneven distribution of mass). Now imagine that you know that this bias is 3/5. It tends to land on one side 3 out of 5 times. But, you do not know if this bias is in favor of heads or in favor of tails.
The evidence collected via spinning the coin informs a person's belief that the bias is in favor of heads or tails. The weight in this case is the number of spins (the sample size), and the strength of the evidence is the proportion of times the coin came up heads. Bayes' rule implies both the weight and the strength of the evidence should have equal importance in determining the confidence of the bias in the coin.
Critically, Griffin and Tversky (1992) found that when participants judged the probability of a heads bias relative to tails, these judgments were influenced more by changes in the strength than changes in the the weight of available evidence. This greater influence of strength over weight not only included judgments about chance (or aleatory) events, but also beliefs about epistemic events (i.e., whether a fact was true or not) as well.
The standard explanation for why strength carries more influence on judgments than weight resides in a dual-process framework (Kahneman, 2003; Sloman, 1996) . That is, case-based information, such as sample proportion, is intuitively and rapidly assessed by a heuristic system (System 1), while accurate computation of likelihoods integrating class-based weight information requires the action of a second, more deliberative system (System 2) (Brenner, Griffin, & Koehler, 2012) . This theory suggests that the gap arises, particularly at short time intervals, because System 1 has more time to operate and therefore processes more information than does System 2, resulting in an emphasis on strength relative to weight information in observed responses.
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